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Over-the-Air Updates [Explained]
Sending new code to a parked car is the easy part. Proving it landed safely, everywhere, is the real work.

Over-the-air updates are usually explained with one comparison. Your car now updates like your phone. I have used that line myself, and it is about half right. The download looks the same. Almost everything that happens before and after the download does not.
A phone update touches one computer, and if it fails you restart it on the sofa. A vehicle update can touch dozens of computers made by different suppliers, some of which decide how much the car accelerates or when it brakes. It has to be approved, targeted to the exact configuration of each car, verified before it runs, and reversible when something goes wrong. In Europe, Japan and China it is also regulated. This article explains how over-the-air updates work, what they can and cannot reach, and why the hard part sits far away from the radio.
The idea is older than the hype around it
In October 2012, when Tesla had built only a few hundred Model S sedans, it pushed software to its customers that added Supercharger support, driver profiles and Creep Mode. It was the first over-the-air program to change how a car behaved, publicly and repeatedly, and it set the expectation the rest of the industry has been chasing since.
The more important moment came 15 months later. In January 2014 Tesla filed a recall covering 29,222 charging adapters supplied with the Model S, because they could overheat. Firmware 5.8.4 detected a poor connection and cut the charging current by 25 percent. Tesla also mailed owners a new adapter with a fuse in it. So the first headline over-the-air recall remedy was really a hybrid of software and a parcel, and that pattern still shows up today.
Compare that with July 2015. Security researchers Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek showed they could reach a Jeep Cherokee remotely through its Uconnect head unit and affect its driving functions. Fiat Chrysler recalled about 1.4 million vehicles. The fix arrived on USB sticks mailed to owners or installed by dealers, while the company blocked the attack path at the cellular network level. The vehicles had a mobile connection and still could not be fixed through it.
Those two stories frame everything that followed. A car with a working update path can close a problem in weeks rather than months. A car without one turns a software flaw into a logistics campaign that takes months and never reaches every vehicle.
What an update can actually reach
The phrase covers several different things, and the industry does not use its own vocabulary consistently. Some engineers say SOTA for software updates to the infotainment and app layer and FOTA for firmware reflashed into control units. Others use SOTA for the whole mechanism. Neither acronym has a formal definition, so the useful question is simpler. Which computers in this car can be updated remotely, and which still need a cable?
The answer depends on how the car was designed. When GM began updating its 2020 Cadillac CT5 and related models over the air, the early releases focused on the head unit, OnStar module, instrument cluster and head-up display rather than the chassis. Coverage is a design decision, made years before the first update ships.
Hardware sets the limit. The safest way to update a control unit is to store a second copy of its software, check that copy, and switch over only when it is proven good. Many controllers instead reflash a single memory bank while the car is parked, relying on the bootloader to recover if something goes wrong. Many small, deeply embedded controllers were built with exactly enough flash memory for one copy. A 2026 USENIX VehicleSec paper by Bosch’s Sekar Kulandaivel, titled Patchlings, describes dual-bank memory as costly and impractical for many of these single-bank platforms, which is why remote updates often stop at the edge of the newer computers.
Follow one update from the server to the car
Picture an engineering team that has fixed a bug in a body controller that manages exterior lighting. Before anything leaves the building, the manufacturer has to decide whether the change affects any approved function. Under the UN rule for software updates, every type-approval-relevant software set carries an identifier called an RXSWIN, and the manufacturer must assess whether a change touches it. A lighting fix might be routine. A change to braking logic could reopen an approval.
Next comes targeting. A single model can exist in hundreds of hardware and software combinations because of trim levels, markets, supplier changes and earlier updates. The backend keeps an inventory of which software version sits on which control unit in which vehicle, identified by its VIN, and builds a campaign only for the cars that match. Getting this inventory wrong is how a correct update lands on the wrong car.
The package is then signed, encrypted and sent to the car’s telematics unit or central computer, which acts as the receiving station. It downloads in the background, often while the car is being driven, and checks every signature before doing anything else. Only then does it pass the pieces to the control units that need them, through the vehicle’s internal network.
Installation waits for the right conditions. UN Regulation 156 requires that the driver be told what the update does, how long it will take and which functions will be unavailable. The vehicle must have enough power to finish, and if updating while driving would be unsafe, the car cannot be driven during installation. BMW says even its larger upgrades rarely take more than about 20 minutes because the preparation happens while the owner is still on the road.
Then comes the step that separates a car from a phone. Where the hardware allows it, the control unit installs the new software into its spare memory bank while the old version keeps running. It checks the new copy, switches over, and reports success to the backend. If the switch fails, the regulation requires the system to return to the previous version or to a safe state. The driver is told either way.
Why one signature is not enough
Signing an update with a private key proves who sent it. It does not protect you if that key is stolen, if a server is compromised, or if someone replays an old, vulnerable version. In 2016 researchers at Tencent’s Keen Security Lab chained flaws in a Tesla Model S browser, its Linux kernel and its gateway firmware to reach the vehicle’s CAN network remotely. Tesla fixed the issue over the air and added code signing to its gateway firmware updates, closing the path the researchers had used.
The industry’s most widely discussed open design for this problem is Uptane. It started with US Department of Homeland Security funding in 2015 for teams at NYU Tandon, the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute and the Southwest Research Institute. It became a formal standard, IEEE-ISTO 6100, in July 2019 and now sits under the Linux Foundation’s Joint Development Foundation. Its core idea is separation. One repository holds approved software images, and the keys that sign them are kept offline under human control. A second, online repository decides which car gets which image. A vehicle installs only when both agree, so an attacker has to compromise more than one system at once.
Uptane is implemented in Automotive Grade Linux and has been used in commercial update platforms from Airbiquity, Toradex and, earlier, HERE. Nobody publishes a reliable figure for how many vehicles use it, so treat any claim that it runs in most cars with suspicion. Neither the UN regulation nor ISO 24089 requires it.
Signing processes also fail in less dramatic ways. On 13 November 2023 Rivian pushed software version 2023.42 to its R1T and R1S trucks and SUVs. The company blamed a human error. The wrong build, signed with the wrong security certificates, had gone out to customers. Infotainment screens went black on roughly 3 percent of the fleet, according to Rivian’s software chief. Most vehicles were repaired over the air, and Rivian said some might need physical repair. The vehicles stayed drivable, and the security checks did their job of refusing the mis-signed software. The lesson engineers took was about recovery. The infotainment units had no graceful way to fall back to a working version.
The rules that turned updates into a managed process
UN Regulation 156 was adopted by the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations in June 2020, alongside its sister rule on cybersecurity, UN Regulation 155. It entered into force in January 2021. In the European Union it became mandatory for new vehicle types from July 2022 and for every new vehicle from July 2024. It asks for two things. The manufacturer needs an audited Software Update Management System at the company level, and each vehicle type must show that its update process meets the requirements. Workshop flashing is covered too. The regulation governs software updates, and over-the-air delivery adds extra obligations on top.
ISO 24089, published in February 2023, sets out the engineering process behind those obligations. It deliberately does not prescribe technologies. China has gone further on supervision. Since 2022 manufacturers have had to file software upgrades with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. A February 2025 notice reinforced rules, in place since 2020, that treat defect-fixing updates as recalls, and in April 2025 the ministry banned public beta testing of driver assistance features and said it wanted to reduce frequent updates. A mandatory national standard, GB 44496-2024, took effect for new type approvals on 1 January 2026.
The United States, which does not use the UN type-approval system, takes a different route. Manufacturers self-certify their vehicles, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration accepts over-the-air software as a valid recall remedy. It now tracks those remedies as their own category in its annual recall reports, and it reopens them when they fall short.
When the update is the recall
The most scrutinized test so far came in December 2023. Tesla recalled 2,031,220 vehicles in the United States over driver-monitoring controls for its Autosteer feature, and the remedy was a free over-the-air release. No affected car needed a service visit to receive it. In April 2024 NHTSA opened a new query into whether that remedy worked, citing 20 crashes in vehicles that already had it installed. The agency noted that parts of the fix were optional and easy for drivers to reverse.
Speed and effectiveness are different measurements. An over-the-air recall can reach millions of cars in weeks, which is far faster than any dealer campaign. But regulators judge the remedy on what it changes in real driving. That is a question about the software, not about the delivery channel.
Traditional manufacturers now use the channel at scale. In February 2026 Ford recalled roughly 4.3 to 4.4 million US trucks and SUVs, including the F-150, Super Duty and Expedition, because the integrated trailer module could lose communication. The remedy was a software update available over the air, through mobile service or at a dealer. Ford’s chief operating officer, Kumar Galhotra, has said over-the-air fixes cost 95 percent less than physical repairs, and that roughly a third of Ford’s recalls over three years were software related, according to Ford Authority. Those are Ford’s figures, but the direction is hard to argue with.
BMW gives a sense of the volume. By the end of September 2024 the company said it had installed more than 10 million remote software upgrades across more than 9 million upgradable vehicles. Updates that once required a workshop appointment have become routine fleet operations.
When the update is the defect
The channel that fixes problems can also create them. Around 10 October 2025, a remote update to the telematics module in Jeep Wrangler 4xe plug-in hybrids disrupted its communication with the hybrid control processor. Some vehicles lost drive power, including at highway speed. Stellantis recalled 24,238 vehicles from model years 2023 to 2025, applied an interim fix on its servers, and began work on a permanent remedy. The module that delivers updates turned out to be part of the safety chain.
Hardware ages in ways software teams rarely plan for. When AT&T shut down its 3G network on 22 February 2022, cars from many manufacturers lost emergency calling, remote unlock and live traffic. GM reconfigured some modems remotely. Tesla offered older Model S owners a paid LTE modem upgrade. A car can outlive the network it was designed to use, and the update plan has to account for that from the first day.
What over-the-air really means
Over-the-air delivery is a mechanism, and it is easy to mistake it for the whole capability. BMW and Ford both built large update programs on vehicles that still rely on many distributed control units. What makes an update program trustworthy is everything around the radio. The manufacturer knows exactly what software sits in every car, decides which approvals each change touches, proves the update came from the right place, and can bring the car back if something goes wrong.
That is also why the hard work looks boring from the outside. Inventory databases, signing ceremonies, approval assessments and rollback paths do not appear in launch videos. They decide whether an update is a service or a risk.
For engineering leaders, whether the car can be updated is settled. What remains open is how many of its computers can be updated safely, by whom, and with what evidence left behind when a regulator or a customer asks what changed.
Words you will hear
OTA. Over-the-air. Software delivered to a vehicle through a wireless connection instead of a cable at a workshop.
SOTA and FOTA. Informal labels for software and firmware updates over the air. They are used inconsistently across the industry and have no formal definition.
TCU. Telematics control unit. The module with the cellular modem that usually receives update packages first.
A/B or dual-bank update. Installing new software into a spare memory bank while the old version keeps running, then switching only after the new copy is verified.
RXSWIN. An identifier for the software that is relevant to a vehicle’s type approval under a given UN regulation.
SUMS. Software Update Management System. The audited company-level process required by UN Regulation 156.
Uptane. An open security framework for vehicle software updates, standardized as IEEE-ISTO 6100.
This article is part of the AutomotiveCloudWatch Explained series, which covers software-defined vehicles, zonal architecture, in-vehicle networks, drive-by-wire and autonomous driving. For the operating system that sits beneath many of these update targets, read How QNX Works and Why It Is Difficult to Replicate.
How QNX Works and Why It Is Difficult to Replicate
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All opinions are my own and do not reflect those of my employer.
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